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Abstract: Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) System with Consignment Inventory (CI) policy is a solution for many supply 
chain leaders in a highly competitive market. In this paper, totally eight different inventory supply chain models are studied. 
The profit function of supplier and manufacturer in different environments are compared in order to show the profitability of 
the overall supply chain management system in a manufacturing industry with different time horizons. The inventory systems 
are applied on a supply chain consisting of a single supplier and a manufacturer. The main focus of this study is to analyze 
the effect of payment deferral and the time value of money in push and pull (Kanban) manufacturing systems when VMI-CI 
policy is applied. 
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1. Introduction
Vendor managed inventory models (VMI) represent a new generation of supply chain inventory policies, which aim 
to increase total profitability of the supply chain. The combination of VMI with Consignment Inventory (CI) is referred to as 
the VMI-CI concept and has been defined in several ways by various researchers. According to Copacino (1993), in a VMI 
model, the supplier is responsible for monitoring and controlling inventory at their own stores, as well as at warehouses of the 
manufacturers (customers). In this policy, the supplier makes decisions for manufacturer warehouse inventory replenishment 
also. Therefore, the supplier inventory planning can be merged with manufacturing and transportation processes and this in-
tegration can result in decreasing total inventory related costs, and in increasing total supply chain profitability. The Con-
signment Inventory System (CIS) is a policy in which inventory even at the manufacturer’s warehouse is owned by the sup-
plier and is considered as sold only when it is either used by the manufacturer or is sold by the manufacturer to their custom-
ers. For MRP planning and other production decisions, CIS policy can assist decision-makers in keeping better track of prod-
ucts and market demand. Also, CIS policy forces suppliers to increase quality thus reducing defects and sale loss (Copacino, 
1993). By combining these two policies together (VMI-CI), the supplier is not only the decision-maker of the inventory in the 
manufacturer store but is also responsible for the manufacturer’s inventory cost.  
The coordination between supply chain drivers can be defined as the collaboration of supply chain elements, which 
is classified into two categories: centralized and decentralized (Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo, 2004). A centralized supply 
chain model is where the decisions are made for the whole supply chain as a single system rather than for each part individu-
ally (Li et al., 2009). Also, a fully coordinated centralized supply chain (also referred to as a cooperative supply chain) al-
ways has greater profitability than decentralized supply chain models (Li et al., 2009). In decentralized (non-cooperative) 
supply chain models, the decision-maker is usually the buyer and the supplier is the follower (Wang et al., 2004). Although 
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decentralized models have less profitability comparatively, the supply chain leaders can increase the amount of total profit of 
the supply chain by incorporating consignment contracts (Cachon and Fisher, 2000). According to Cottrill (1997), by apply-
ing the VMI-CI system to a decentralized supply chain model, total profitability can be increased, along with an improvement 
in production and market share (Cottrill, 1997). 
The type of inventory control contract is crucial in profitability when developing supply chain models. The tradi-
tional policy, which is called Inventory Sourcing (IS), is a purchasing contract in which the customer is billed by the vendor 
after the product has been delivered. The lack of coordination in this method has led supply chain leaders to adopt new mod-
els. However, Inventory Sourcing is still useful in some small markets with low demand rates (Gümüş et al., 2008). 
While a few CI models have been studied, the novelty of this work is analysis of CI under a Kanban system. The 
system is also studied for payment delays, which are reduced to make the supplier support the CIs. 
The objective of this study is to compare the individual profit functions of both supplier and buyer in different envi-
ronments and to obtain optimized profitability functions. Moreover, this paper focuses on extending the work done by Dong 
and Xu (Dong and Xu, 2002) by considering payment delay in Push and  Kanban system in two different time horizons. Also, 
when focusing on total profitability of the supply chain, a methodology is proposed in order to help the supplier to find a 
proper manufacturer.  
2. Literature Review 
 
In the last decade, there has been a considerable amount of research conducted on synchronization of supply chain 
drivers including; location, transportation, inventory, and information. However, given its great potential, this area is in need 
of more development-related ideas. Generally, there is no precise definition for a VMI model since these models are dis-
cussed in the literature with different definitions. For example, Quick Response (QR), Continuous Replenishment (CR), Rap-
id Replenishment (RR), and Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR) are all VMI models 
(Holmström et al., 2002).  
When a supply chain adopts VMI policy, the buyer lets the supplier deal with market demand directly by controlling 
the inventory flow of raw materials to delivery and finally, to customers. Hence, the supplier is able to schedule production, 
transportation, inventory storage, and delivery in an integrated model, which produces more cooperation within supply chain 
elements and results in higher efficiency and lower total cost of the whole supply chain (Dejonckheere et al., 2003). For in-
stance, a contract that consists of two parameters of revenue sharing plus surplus subsidy has been developed by Gerchak and 
Wang for a single manufacturer supply chain model with many suppliers (Gerchak and Wang, 2004). 
VMI models have been mostly adopted in retail companies. For example, by applying VMI policy, Wal-Mart and 
J.C. Penny have had great improvements in inventory turnover and sales (Buzzell and Ortmeyer, 1995; Stalk et al., 1992). 
Moreover, VMI models have also been applied in other industries such as; steel, books and petrochemicals (Disney et al., 
2003; Lamb, 1997). Recently, models those combine VMI with CI, have been utilized by online retailer companies such as 
Amazon, eBay, and Alibaba (Li et al., 2009) Within all these companies from different domains, the fundamental concept of 
all VMI models are the same, however, there are several different modifications of VMI/CI models in regard to terms and 
conditions. 
Payment deferral (or delay time) in VMI-CI models is one of the primary focuses of this paper. This strategy helps 
distributors maintain business with retailers (Michaelraj and Shahabudeen, 2009). Consider a situation where a buyer needs 
to replenish their own inventory. After receiving an order, the distributor will attempt to deliver the goods as late as possible 
in order to benefit from payment deferral (Huang and Lin, 2005). In addition, there is a distributer concern that the retailer 
may change the product, upon which the distributor must provide an additional service in order to remove the excess invento-
ry in the retailer’s store. VMI can be developed in order to resolve the aforementioned retailer and distributer issues (Huang 
and Lin, 2005; Michaelraj and Shahabudeen, 2009). Michaelraj and Shahabudeen (2009) explained VMI models from both 
retailer and distributer viewpoints. From the retailer’s point of view, there is no longer a delay in the transfer of goods since 
the distributor is still the owner of goods. From distributer’s point of view, there is no concern of excess inventory removal 
from the retailer’s store considering the inventory system is monitored and controlled by the distributor. They also developed 
two replenishment models in order to minimize the total balance of payment (BP) while maximizing total sale (Michaelraj 
and Shahabudeen, 2009). 
Models with different inventory policies vary on their VMI contract type and their supply chain structure. Some ex-
amples for two-echelon supply chain model with VMI policy are (Christopher, 1998; Disney et al., 2003; Holmström et al., 
2002). On the other hand, (Chen et al., 2000; Lee et al., 1997; Sucky, 2009) studied VMI policy on three-level supply chain 
models with different type of demands (deterministic and stochastic stationary demands). Depending on the type of supplier 
and buyer VMI contract, the supplier may be responsible for the buyer’s store inventory control, a customer distribution cen-
ter, or a manufacturing location (Shah and Goh, 2006). However, regardless of the type of VMI contract, Piplani and Viswa-
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nathan (2003) showed that the total inventory cost of a supply chain decreases after applying a VMI policy in the supply 
chain. (Piplani and Viswanathan, 2003). 
There are some issues in case of applicability of VMI models, the first issue is how to fairly share the benefits result-
ing from a VMI contract between different supply chain elements. A recent study by Karsten and Basten (2013) carried out a 
cost allocation problem in spare parts inventory model where back ordering is allowed. They discussed four essential as-
sumptions that are necessary for a stable cost allocation methodology. Another issue comes up with applying VMI model in 
system with constraints. Drawish and Odah (2010) developed a VMI supply chain model with a single vendor and multiple 
retailers, which considers storage capacity limitation. In their proposed VMI contract between multiple retailers and one ven-
dor, the vendor considers a penalty cost for items exceeding bounds. The developed model can easily describe supply chains 
with capacity constraints by selecting high penalty cost (Darwish and Odah, 2010). Dealing with NP-hard models is also an 
issue for VMI models. Using a meta-heuristic method is considered to be one of the best ways to obtain a “good” answer in a 
reasonable amount of time for mathematical supply chain models. In fact, there are several studies that focus on solving more 
complex VMI models (Cárdenas-Barrón et al., 2012a; Cárdenas-Barrón et al., 2012b; Leuveano et al., 2012; Pasandideh et 
al., 2011; Sadeghi et al., 2013). 
As previously mentioned, this study expands on the work done by Dong and Xu (2002) who studied the profit func-
tion of the supplier and the buyer while before and after signing a VMI contract. The authors concluded that utilizing VMI 
strategy can result in many advantages for the supply chain and may also eventually decrease supply chain inventory related 
costs (Dong and Xu, 2002). After adapting VMI policy, the buyer will have an increase in its profit function in both short and 
long term and will be able to share the profit with the supplier by increasing purchasing quality and price. Overall, after sur-
veying the literature and reviewing Dong and Xu’s paper, there is a potential for extending their work. According to their 
assumptions, the decision maker for the supply chain is the buyer and the supplier should act based on the buyer’s decision. 
An important point however, is that Dong and Xu do not consider the effect of payment deferral and time value of money in 
their model while in practice, the buyer will usually try to put off the payment for as long as possible in order to take ad-
vantage of the time value of money. Another point is that the amount of payment and profit function will be different when 
the supply chain adopts a pull system in their manufacturing system. Following Dong and Xu’s model, this study also con-
siders the previous points in a supply chain in order develop a more practical model and to analyze the effects on the profita-
bility of supply chain elements. 
3. Account Payment Time Model 
 
3.1.  Supply Chain Description 
 
This work takes inspiration from an actual case study. The manufacturer (buyer) here provides automotive compo-
nents to one of the major automobile companies in the U.S. This component manufacturer gets their plastic molds from a 
plastics supplier. For the plastic molds supplier, this buyer is very important one for their business. The buyer recently initiat-
ed with the supplier a consignment inventory policy. Both the parties feel that the new policy would have mutual benefits. As 
a part of this initiative, the buyer is willing to reduce the days for payment, as an incentive.  The buyer already has a Kanban 
system for their manufacturing and is now trying to integrate that with the consignment inventory system.   
 
Model Description  
 
The supply chain network modeled in this study consists of one supplier and one buyer (manufacturer). It is assumed 
that the system deals with a single product with deterministic demand. Also, there is no time lost across the supply chain. 
Essentially, the demand at the buyer and the demand at the supplier are is assumed to be stable and hence an inventory policy 
follows EOQ policy. The material sent by the supplier stays at the warehouse of the buyer, until withdrawn for further pro-
cessing. The buyer follows a Kanban pull system for manufacturing. Both the buyer and the supplier have agreed to have 
consignment payment, in which the supplier gets paid only on material that is actually withdrawn by the buyer for use in the 
plant. Until that time, the supplier is responsible for inventory and the related holding costs. The time value of money is as-
sumed to be known.   Anything else here? In the following sections, various models under different scenarios are presented. 
First, a scenario with instantaneous payment is presented, for a consignment inventory system, with a chosen Lot Size, and 
for a consignment inventory Kanban pull system. Then the same scenarios are considered for a delayed payment system. 
Both the above cases are for infinite time horizon situations. A finite time horizon model is illustrated for one of the above 
cases. In the later part of the paper, an optimization model is presented to minimize the total costs of both the supplier and the 
manufacturer, without and with a Kanban system. 
43
Industrial and Systems Engineering Review, 6(1), 2018  ISSN (Online): 2329-0188 
Ramrakhyani et al. 
ISER © 2018  
http://iser.sisengr.org 
 
Model Notations and Assumptions 
 
The following are the notations used in the model: 
 
Q Order quantity delivery by the supplier 
q Quantity pulled by the manufacturer in Kanban system  
T Replenishment cycle time interval for Q 
t Withdrawal time interval of q in Kanban system 
n Number of withdrawals in a cycle 
r Interest rate (time value of money) 
C Cost of one unit for the buyer or selling price of the supplier per unit (W) 
S1 
 
Sum of discounted payments under Instantaneous payment withdrawal for Q 
S2 
 
Sum of discounted payments under Instantaneous payment for q in Kanban system 
𝑆𝑆1́ Sum of discounted payments under payment delay for Q 
𝑆𝑆2́ Present Worth of the sum of payments under payment delay for q  
t1 Time delay of payment for Q 
t2 Time delay of payment for q in Kanban system 
y  
 
Annual demand for the product 
𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀  Profit function of manufacturer before VMI 
𝜋𝜋𝑆𝑆 Profit function of supplier before VMI 
?́?𝜋𝑀𝑀 Profit function of manufacturer in Kanban system 
𝜋𝜋?́?𝑆  Profit function of supplier in Kanban system 
𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐  Contract purchasing price determined by the manufacturer in Kanban system  
C(y) 
 
Production and distribution cost for y 
P(y) Sale price (inverse demand function) of the final product  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  Supplier’s order set up cost/order 
𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀 Manufacturer’s order set up cost /order  
ℎ𝑆𝑆 Supplier’s inventory carrying cost/unit 
ℎ𝑀𝑀 Manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost/unit 
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆  Profit function of supplier after VMI (fixed time period case A) 
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀 Profit function of manufacturer after VMI (fixed time period case A) 
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆  Profit function of supplier after VMI in Kanban system (fixed time period case B) 
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐  
 
Profit function of manufacturer after VMI in Kanban system (fixed time period case B) 
𝑆𝑆1́
́  
 
Sum of discounted payment withdrawals for Q after VMI (fixed time period case A) 
𝑆𝑆2́
́  Sum of discounted payment withdrawals for q after VMI in Kanban system  
𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐 Annual demand after VMI. 
n The number of Kanban pulls in one inventory replenishment cycle 
PON Point of neutrality 
 
 
The following are the other assumptions for the system: 
• n is an integer and n>=1.  
• T (the replenishment cycle interval) is constant. 
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3.2. Infinitive Cycle Period Models 
 
Here, the planning horizon is taken as infinity. The total discounted payments by the manufacturer, the Present 
Worth, is calculated. 
 
3.2.1. Instantaneous Payment  
 
The first type of models under infinite cycle periods are of instantaneous payments, where it is assumed that the 
manufacturer pays the supplier as soon as the supply is received or consigned.  
 
3.2.1.1 Consignment Inventory - Traditional Model 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is before adapting VMI-CI policy, and an EOQ model is used in order to minimize the inventory cost.  This is a 
push model, where the supplier tries to sell the product to the manufacturer at every fixed duration of time and receives the 
payment instantaneously. Figure 1 represents the manufacturer’s inventory behavior. As shown in Figure 1, in every cycle, a 
fixed quantity of Q is supplied to the manufacturer at every T and the payment withdrawal by the supplier is exactly after 
delivery withdrawals T, 2T, 3T …. The amount Q could be an arbitrarily chosen one, or an EOQ from the perspective of the 
manufacturer. The Present Worth of the sum of discounted payments is given by: 
    S1 = QC +  QCe−rT + QCe−r2T + QCe−r3T + ⋯ (1)  S1 = QC [1 +  e−rT + e−r2T + e−r3T + ⋯ ] (2) S1 = QC 1(1 − e−rT) (3) 
 
In this case, the manufacturer does not enjoy any payment deferral. Also, following such a push system may lead to 
an increase in inventory holding cost for the manufacturer as well as increases in other related costs. 
3.2.1.2 Consignment Inventory – Kanban System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Instantaneous Payment Supply Chain Inventory Model 
for Q (The Push system) 
Figure 2: The Instantaneous Payment Supply Chain Inventory Model for q (for n=3) 
Q
TT
Q
q q
ttt
q
T
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In this system, the manufacturer withdraws Kanban quantities of q from the inventory consigned by the supplier. 
The supplier is paid on these quantities. Let t represent the interval time for each withdrawal, and in this case, withdrawal 
payment. Figure 2 shows the withdrawals in such a Kanban system, for a supplier’s supply of Q and cycle time of T, when 
there are 3 withdrawals per cycle.  The discounted present worth of instantaneous payment withdrawal for q, for an infinite 
horizon is calculated below:  
 
   S2 = qC +  qCe−rt + qCe−r2t + qCe−r3t + ⋯ (4)  S2 = qC [1 +  e−rt + e−r2t + e−r3t + ⋯ ] (5) S2 = qC 1(1 − e−rt) (6) 
 
 
For these two models the consumption rate is equal. The manufacturer should always try to pay the smaller amount 
of money more frequently. From equations (3) and (6), it can be shown that S1 > S2 always. Therefore, the amount of saving 
for the manufacturer is: 
 S1 − S2 = QC 1(1 − e−rT) − qC 1(1 − e−rt)                   = QC(1 − e−rT) − �Qn�C(1 − e−rt)                   = QC � 1(1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) − 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛(1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)�                                                                                        (7) 
 
 
It can be seen that S2 decreases as n increases. A sample numerical experiment shows the behavior of this 
function S2 1 for C = 10, in Figure 3.  
  
Payment Delay 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To have a successful supply chain system, a close relationship between supplier and manufacturer is essential. How-
ever, in many cases, the payment is not done instantaneously and there are usually some delays between delivering the goods 
by the supplier and when the payment is paid by the manufacturer. In practice, this is very common in that the manufacturer 
                                                 
1 The calculation details are in table A.1 in APPENDIX A. 
Figure 3: Comparison of S1 and S2 with increasing n 
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prefers to pay the payment with maximum possible delay. On the other hand, the supplier prefers to be paid as soon as possi-
ble. In some cases, the payment delay or the payment schedule is specified in the contracts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here, the effects of payment deferral are studied on both push and pull systems. In the push model, where Q is 
economy order quantity and is received by the manufacturer every T time period, the delay t1 effects the payment withdrawal 
calculation. Figure 4 represents the schematic inventory and payment model. Below the sum of payment withdrawals for Q 
(push model) with delay of t1 after delivery interval T, 2T, 3T, … for infinite period of time is calculated: 
 S1 ′ = QCe−r 𝑟𝑟1 + QCe−r(T+𝑟𝑟1) + QCe−r(2T+𝑟𝑟1) + ⋯ (8) = QCe−r𝑟𝑟1[1 + e−rT + e−r2T + ⋯ ] (9) S1 ′ = QCe−r𝑟𝑟1 1(1−e−rT) = S1e−r𝑟𝑟1 (10) 
 
From equation (10) it can be seen that the discounted sum of payments received by the supplier decreases as t1 in-
creases. Hence in many cases this period of payment delay is agreed upon by both the parties.  
Next, the payment for q (pull system) with a certain amount of delay (t2) after withdrawal intervals t, 2t, 3t, etc., for 
an infinite period of time is considered. In this situation, the Kanban and payment deferral policies are integrated. Therefore, 
the manufacturer pays based on market demand and also enjoys the deferral of the payment. Figure 5 depicts a schematic 
view of the model. If Q is kept constant, then when increasing the number of withdrawals per cycle, the quantity of q de-
creases2. The discounted sum will be given by  
 
                                                      S2 ′ = qCe−r𝑟𝑟2 1(1−e−rt) = S2e−r𝑟𝑟2                                                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The calculation details are in table A.2 in APPENDIX A. 
Figure 5: The Payment Delay-Supply Chain Inventory Model for q (n=3) 
Figure 4: The Payment Delay-Supply Chain Inventory Model for Q 
 
q q
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q
T
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Q
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 The behavior of the sum of discounted payments for q for increasing payment delays is shown in Figure 6. It is 
the largest for t2 = 0 and decreases exponentially as t2 increases. In comparing to a similar sum for the case of payments for a 
supplier’s lot of Q, this behavior can sometimes be classified in three parts. Initially, the amount of payment withdrawal for 
Q (push system) for a given payment delay t1 may be lower than the amount of payment withdrawal for q (pull system). By 
increasing the amount of delay (t2), the payment withdrawal for q decreases. There is a point in which these two models have 
an equal amount of payment withdrawal. The corresponding delay of this point is called Point of Neutrality (PON). The Point 
of Neutrality is where both of the financial forces are equal. Hence, if the manufacturer has to make a payment withdrawal 
low, then there must be an increase of payment delay time above the PON value. Similarly, if the manufacturer works in the 
range of time delay before the PON, then it will help the supplier with its profit functions. But it is always recommended for 
both the manufacturer and supplier to be at the PON so that both entities can remain at the same profit level as before. Also, 
the supplier can equally benefit by still working with the manufacturer. Knowing the assumptions: S1  ′ = S2  ′ and Q q = Tt =n → T = nt, the value of point of neutrality is calculated3: 
Moreover, according to the last equation, two useful statements can be derived4: 
 
Lemma I: The time delay of payment for t2 (q) is less than time delay of payment for t1 (Q). 
Since S1 > S2, for the same demand rate and interest rate, comparison of the payment delays will yield that t1 will be greater 
than t2, if the discounted total payments in both the cases of lots of Q and Kanban lots of q are equal.  That is, if S1  ′ = S2  ′, 
then t2 < t1 
Lemma II: If the payment delay is kept same, then switching to pull system reduces the payment withdrawal. 
In order to apply Kanban system, it is essential for supply-chain leaders to be able to understand and analyze the behavior of 
the payment withdrawal functions in different situations. As an illustration, the behavior of payment withdrawal functions is 
compared for two different situations. Figure 7 represents the behavior of payment withdrawals for both push and pull mod-
els. When delay times for both systems are equal, the withdrawal quantity (q) amount is constant and the amount of order (Q) 
increases5. Hence, the manufacturer can take advantage by increasing the number of withdrawals per cycle. Figure 8 is also 
showing the behavior of payment withdrawals for both models in which the withdrawal quantity (q) and t1 are held constant 
and Q and t2 are increasing6. 
 
 
                                                 
3 See APPENDIX B. for proof. 
4 See APPENDIX C. for proof. 
5 For details, see APPENDIX A. Table A.3 
6 For details, see Table A.4 in APPENDIX A. 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃: t∗2 = ln �kn� /r +  𝑡𝑡1, where,                                         (11)                                
                                                                    𝑘𝑘 = ��1−e−rnt�(1−e−rt) �                                                              (12) 
Figure 6: Point of Neutrality (PON) when 𝑆𝑆1́ = 𝑆𝑆2́, for a given t1 
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3.3. Fixed Cycle Period Time (One Year) 
This section studies the effect of payment delay in push and Kanban systems in short term. The basic elements are 
the same as the infinite cycle model. Like the previous section, two models are surveyed. The first model considers a one-
year cycle period for the push system (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1). The amount of payment withdrawal for Q in this model ( S1′′) is calculated 
as: 
  S1′′ = QCe−r𝑟𝑟1 + QCe−r(T+𝑟𝑟1) + QCe−r(2T+𝑟𝑟1)+ ……………..QCe−r�(m−1)T+𝑟𝑟1� (13) S1′′ = QC[e−r𝑟𝑟1 + e−r(T+𝑟𝑟1) + e−r(2T+𝑟𝑟1)+ …………….e−r�(m−1)T+𝑟𝑟1�] (14) 
  S1′′ = QCe−r𝑟𝑟1 + QCe−r(T+𝑟𝑟1) + QCe−r(2T+𝑟𝑟1)+ ……………..QCe−r�(m−1)T+𝑟𝑟1� (13) S1′′ = QC[e−r𝑟𝑟1 + e−r(T+𝑟𝑟1) + e−r(2T+𝑟𝑟1)+ …………….e−r�(m−1)T+𝑟𝑟1�] (14) S1′′ = QCe−r𝑟𝑟1�1 − e−mrT�1 − e−rT  (15) 
Another model (pull system), where the delay in payment withdrawal is represented by t2 and the amount of deliv-
ery is q after intervals 𝑡𝑡, 2𝑡𝑡, 3𝑡𝑡, … ,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡; the payment withdrawal (S2′′) is obtained by the following equations (𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 = 1): 
 S2′′ = qCe−r𝑟𝑟2 + qCe−r(t+𝑟𝑟2) + qCe−r(2t+𝑟𝑟2) + ⋯… … … qCe−r�(mn−1)t+𝑟𝑟2� (16) S2′′ = qC[e−r𝑟𝑟2 + e−r(t+𝑟𝑟2) + e−r(2t+𝑟𝑟2) + ⋯… … … e−r�(mn−1)t+𝑟𝑟2�] (17) 
Figure 8:  Comparison of 𝑆𝑆1́ 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝑆𝑆2́  with increasing (Q) and 𝑡𝑡2 , while 𝑡𝑡1 is constant. 
Figure 7: Comparison of 𝑆𝑆1́ 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝑆𝑆2́  with increasing (Q) when 𝑡𝑡1 = 𝑡𝑡2. 
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S2′′ = qCe−r𝑟𝑟2(1 − e−mnrt)1 − e−rt  (18) 
When these two models are compared, as in the previous section for infinite model, delays are kept equal and con-
stant as well as the withdrawal quantity (q). Using these assumptions and by increasing the number of withdrawals per cycle 
(n), Figure 9 is generated7. As shown, while t1 = t2, it can be proven (same as previous section) that S1 ′′ > S2 ′′ . PON is also 
calculated in the same way and has the same results as the previous section. Thus, for both infinite and short-term models, 
there is no change in the value of delay for which the payment withdrawals are found to be equal. Also, the same result for 
Lemma II can be obtained. Therefore, for the manufacturer, it is always beneficial to adopt Kanban system while the payment 
delays are equal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Optimization Model 
 
The main reason for adopting VMI-CI is to systematically increase the profit functions of the total supply chain. 
Dong and Xu suggested a methodology to increase the amount of profit function of both players (supplier and buyer). As 
explained previously in VMI-CI policy, the inventory of the manufacturer is owned and controlled by the supplier. Further 
expanding their work, this section analyzes the amount of yearly profitability by incorporating payment deferral and time 
value of money in the supply chain VMI model for both push and Kanban systems. Notations and assumptions are the same 
as the previous section. 
 
4.1.  Model Structure 
 
4.1.1. Before VMI 
This section briefly describes the profit function of the players before applying VMI policy when the manufacturer 
and the supplier are owners of their inventory. As a result, for the manufacturer, the best case is that they follow EOQ inven-
tory rules in which the economy order quantity is obtained as follows: 
 QM = EOQ = �2 ∗ Annual Demand ∗  Manufacturer’s set up Cost Manufacturer’s Inventory Holding Cost/Unit �  12 QM = EOQ = �2SMyhM �  12 (19) 
                                                 
7 Table A.5 contains the calculation details, see the APPENDIX A. 
 
Figure 9: Comparison of 𝑆𝑆1́ 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝑆𝑆2́ with increasing (Q) when 𝑡𝑡1 = 𝑡𝑡2. 
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To achieve the profit function of the manufacturer, the total amount of annual costs (in the case of inventory) should 
be subtracted from the annual purchasing income. Total supplier’s cost is obtained by the following equation: 
 
 
�
Annual Production   and distribution Cost � + �Supplier′s Order set up    Cost /order ∗ Annual Demand QM + Supplier′s  Inventory  Holding  Cost /unit ∗ QM 2 � Total Supplier′s Cost = c(y) + �SS yQM + hSQM 2 � (20)  
As stated before, in this system the supplier should follow the economic order quantity of the manufacturer. The an-
nual profit function of the supplier: 
 
 
�
TOTAL SUPPLIER′S   PROFIT FUNCTION � =  �Annual Contract   Purchasing Price � – � Annual Production  and distribution Cost � –� Supplier′s  Inv Holding and Order set up Cost � 
π S = w y − c(y) − �SS yQM + hSQ M 2 � (21) 
 With replacing Q𝑀𝑀, with equation (19), the profit function of the supplier would be as the below:  
π S = w y − c(y) − �hMSMy2 �12 �SSSM + hShM� (22) 
  After identifying the profit function of the supplier, the same process takes place for calculating profit function  of the company. 
  Total Buyer′s Cost =   �Contract Purchasing   Price
unit
�  ∗ Annual Demand + 
�
Manufacturer′s Order set up    Cost /order ∗ Annual Demand Q M + Manufacturer’s  Inv Holding    Cost /unit ∗ QM 2 � Total Buyer′s Cost = w y + �SM yQM + hMQ M 2 � (23)  
�
TOTAL MANUFACTURER′S   PROFIT FUNCTION � =  (Annual Sale Price )– �Annual Contract   Purchasing Cost � –�Manufacturer′s Inv Holding and Order set up Cost � 
π M = P(y)y − w 𝐲𝐲 − (𝟐𝟐hMSMy) 12 (24)  
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4.1.2. After VMI-CI (Dong and Xu Model) 
 
As previously discussed, in Consignment Inventory management, the supplier not only decides when to supply the 
product but is also responsible for determining the amount of order quantity for the manufacturer. 
By adopting VMI-CI in the supply chain, the manufacturer is no longer responsible for controlling its own invento-
ry. Instead, the supplier is the owner and controller of the entire inventory (in its own store and/or at the manufacturer store). 
Based on this modification, the profit functions of the supplier and the manufacturer are re-calculated: 
 QS = EOQ = ��2(SS + SM)y(hS+hM) ��  12 (25) 
πcs = wcy − c(y) − �y(SS + SM)QS + QS(hS + hM)2 � (26) 
πcs = wcy − c(y) − [2(SS + SM)(hS + hM)y  ]1/2 (27) 
 
And the manufacturer’s profit function with eliminating inventory costs is: 
 
πcM = P(y)y − wcy (28) 
 
Regarding the above formula for traditional and VMI models, it is understood that after VMI, the profit function of 
the supplier decreased, and the profit function of the manufacturer increased. 
 
4.1.3. Payment delay– withdrawal for Q 
 
The new VMI-CI models, which consider the effect of time deferral in payment withdrawal are discussed in this sec-
tion. For the push model, it is proposed that the manufacturer accepts to pay the entire amount of Q (economy order quantity) 
with a time delay of t1. The amount of payment (S1′′) for this model is as follows: 
 S1′′ = Q Ce−rt1�1 − e−mrT�1 − e−rT  (29) 
 
Subsequently, the profit function of the supplier and manufacturer is obtained: 
 
πAcs = S1′′ − c(y) − [2(SS + SM)((hS + hM)y  ]1/2 (30) 
πAcM = P(y)y − S1′′ (31) 
 
Comparing the profit functions of VMI-CI models with and without payment deferral, the equation (30) shows that 
the profit function of the supplier decreased after including payment delay in the contract and equation (31) represents that 
the manufacturer’s profit increases with considering payment deferral. Equation (32) and (32) comparing the profit functions 
of supplier and manufacturers in different inventory models: 
   πAcM >  πcM > π M    (32) 
π S > 𝜋𝜋cs > πAcs  (33) 
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4.1.4. After VMI with payment delay – withdrawal for q 
 
As mentioned earlier, the manufacturer will adopt a VMI-CI policy in order to be released from inventory costs and 
instead focus on other issues such as market and quality. In a VMI-CI contract for a Kanban system, the manufacturer only 
pays the supplier for the amount of quantity, which is pulled by the market (q) after every t (withdrawal time interval) time 
period. The payment withdrawal with considering t2 as the allowed delay is: 
 S2′′ = qCe−rt2(1 − e−mnrt)1 − e−rt  (34) 
With respect to this equation, the profit functions of supplier and manufacturer are calculated as: 
 
πBcs = S2′′ − c(y) − �2(SS + SM)(hS + hM)y  �12 (35) 
πBcM = P(y)y − S2′′  (36)   
By comparing the profit of these two profit functions with the previous ones, we have the following results: 
  πBcM >  πAcM > πcM (37)  πcs > πAcs > πBcs (38)   
By applying VMI-CI policy with payment delay in a Kanban system, the profit function of the manufacture increas-
es the most. However, the benefit is not for only manufacturer. After the manufacturer’s profits increase, the manufacturer 
may try to reduce the final market price of the product. As a result of this price reduction, the market demand (y) may in-
crease. With a need for more materials, the manufacturer will order higher quantities from the supplier thus leading to an in-
crease in the supplier’s demand rate. This new demand will therefore help the supplier increase its profit function by making 
use of the so-called ‘low margin high demand’ policy. 
 
4.2. Maximizing the Profit Function Of Supplier At New Annual Demand yc 
 
From the supplier’s point of view, they may want to maximize their profit function by making a contract with a 
manufacturer who has a certain amount of annual market demand. The amount of desirable annual demand is obtained when 
the first derivative of the profit function is equal to zero. Also, in order to make sure that the profit function of the supplier 
concave down; the second order derivative is calculated. APPENDIX D. shows the calculation of the first and second order 
derivatives of the supplier’s profit function.  
 yc = [(SS + SM)(hS + hM)] 2[(S2′′)′ − c′(y)]2  (39) 
 
Hence, at this demand point, the supplier can have the most amount of profit function. Thus, the maximized profit 
functions for supplier are: 
 
πBcs = S2′′ − c(yc) − [2(SS + SM)((hS + hM)yc ]1/2 (40) 
πBcM = P( yc) yc − S2′′ yc (41) 
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5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
This study first described Vendor Managed Inventory models and then illustrated how they are becoming important 
in current supply chain strategies. The aim of this study is to develop a two-echelon supply chain model with a single supplier 
and a single manufacturer in which both push and Kanban systems are considered separately. Essentially, the manufacturer 
usually tends to have a delay in payment withdrawal while the supplier always wants the payment as soon as possible. By 
incorporating this fact into the model, the influence of payment deferral and time value of money for Push and Kanban manu-
facturing systems in both infinite and short term (one year) time horizons are analyzed. Although signing a VMI-CI contract 
has considerable benefits for a supply chain in the long term, the amount of supplier’s profitability is reduced. Therefore, a 
methodology proposed to help supplier to maximize its profit function. In reality, however, the effect of payment deferral is 
always a big issue in supply chain contracts. Studying and analyzing this issue is one of the future directions in this area for 
other supply chain models. This study has some limitations. For instance, the demand can be considered as deterministic, 
however, this condition cannot be always true in the real world. Using a stochastic demand variable in assumptions can help 
develop a more realistic inventory model. 
6. References 
 
 Buzzell, R. D., & Ortmeyer, G. (1995). Channel partnerships streamline distribution. MIT Sloan Management Review, 36(3), 
85.  
Cachon, G. P., & Fisher, M. (2000). Supply chain inventory management and the value of shared information. Management 
science, 46(8), 1032-1048.  
Cárdenas-BarróN, L. E., Taleizadeh, A. A., & TreviñO-Garza, G. (2012). An improved solution to replenishment lot size 
problem with discontinuous issuing policy and rework, and the multi-delivery policy into economic production lot 
size problem with partial rework. Expert Systems with Applications, 39(18), 13540-13546.. 
Cárdenas-Barrón, L. E., Treviño-Garza, G., & Wee, H. M. (2012). A simple and better algorithm to solve the vendor 
managed inventory control system of multi-product multi-constraint economic order quantity model. Expert Systems 
with Applications, 39(3), 3888-3895.  
Chen, F., Drezner, Z., Ryan, J. K., & Simchi-Levi, D. (2000). Quantifying the bullwhip effect in a simple supply chain: The 
impact of forecasting, lead times, and information. Management science, 46(3), 436-443.  
Christopher, M. (1999). Logistics and Supply Chain Management: Strategies for Reducing Cost and Improving Service 
Financial Times: Pitman Publishing. London, 1998 ISBN 0 273 63049 0 (hardback) 294+ 1× pp. 
Copacino, W. C. (1993). Logistics strategy: how to get with the program. Traffic Management, 32(8), 23-24. 
Cottrill, K. (1997). Reforging the supply chain. Journal of Business Strategy, 18(6), 35-39. 
Darwish, M. A., & Odah, O. M. (2010). Vendor managed inventory model for single-vendor multi-retailer supply 
chains. European Journal of Operational Research, 204(3), 473-484.  
Dejonckheere, J., Disney, S. M., Lambrecht, M. R., & Towill, D. R. (2003). Measuring and avoiding the bullwhip effect: A 
control theoretic approach. European Journal of Operational Research, 147(3), 567-590. 
Disney, S. M., Potter, A. T., & Gardner, B. M. (2003). The impact of vendor managed inventory on transport 
operations. Transportation research part E: logistics and transportation review, 39(5), 363-380. 
Dong, Y., & Xu, K. (2002). A supply chain model of vendor managed inventory. Transportation research part E: logistics 
and transportation review, 38(2), 75-95.  
Gerchak, Y., & Wang, Y. (2004). Revenue‐sharing vs. wholesale‐price contracts in assembly systems with random 
demand. Production and operations Management, 13(1), 23-33. 
Giannoccaro, I., & Pontrandolfo, P. (2004). Supply chain coordination by revenue sharing contracts. International journal of 
production economics, 89(2), 131-139. 
GGümüş, M., Jewkes, E. M., & Bookbinder, J. H. (2008). Impact of consignment inventory and vendor-managed inventory 
for a two-party supply chain. International Journal of Production Economics, 113(2), 502-517. 
Holmström, J., Främling, K., Kaipia, R., & Saranen, J. (2002). Collaborative planning forecasting and replenishment: new 
solutions needed for mass collaboration. Supply chain management: An international journal, 7(3), 136-145. 
Huang, Y. F., & Lin, Y. S. (2005). An EPQ model under permissible delay in payments and cash discount. Journal of 
Applied Sciences, 5(2), 273-276. 
Karsten, F., & Basten, R. J. (2014). Pooling of spare parts between multiple users: How to share the benefits?. European 
journal of operational research, 233(1), 94-104. 
Lamb, M. R. (1997). Vendor managed inventory:[service center] customers like the possibilities. Metal Center 
News(USA), 37(2), 42-44. 
54
Industrial and Systems Engineering Review, 6(1), 2018  ISSN (Online): 2329-0188 
Ramrakhyani et al. 
ISER © 2018  
http://iser.sisengr.org 
Lee, H. L., Padmanabhan, V., & Whang, S. (1997). Information distortion in a supply chain: The bullwhip 
effect. Management science, 43(4), 546-558. 
Leuveano, A. C., Jafar, F. A. B., & Muhamad, M. R. B. (2012, August). Development of genetic algorithm on multi-vendor 
integrated procurement-production system under shared transportation and just-in-time delivery system. 
In Uncertainty Reasoning and Knowledge Engineering (URKE), 2012 2nd International Conference on (pp. 78-81). 
IEEE. 
Li, S., Zhu, Z., & Huang, L. (2009). Supply chain coordination and decision making under consignment contract with 
revenue sharing. International Journal of Production Economics, 120(1), 88-99. 
Michaelraj, L. A., & Shahabudeen, P. (2009). Replenishment policies for sustainable business development in a continuous 
credit based vendor managed inventory distribution system. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 56(1), 260-266.  
Pasandideh, S. H. R., Niaki, S. T. A., & Nia, A. R. (2011). A genetic algorithm for vendor managed inventory control system 
of multi-product multi-constraint economic order quantity model. Expert Systems with Applications, 38(3), 2708-
2716. 
Piplani, R., & Viswanathan, S. (2003). A model for evaluating supplier-owned inventory strategy. International Journal of 
Production Economics, 81, 565-571. 
Sadeghi, J., Sadeghi, S., & Niaki, S. T. A. (2014). A hybrid vendor managed inventory and redundancy allocation 
optimization problem in supply chain management: An NSGA-II with tuned parameters. Computers & Operations 
Research, 41, 53-64.  
Shah, J., & Goh, M. (2006). Setting operating policies for supply hubs. International Journal of Production 
Economics, 100(2), 239-252. 
Stalk, G., Evans, P., & Shulman, L. E. (1992). Competing on capabilities: The new rules of corporate strategy. Harvard 
business review, 70(2), 57-69.  
Sucky, E. (2009). The bullwhip effect in supply chains—An overestimated problem?. International Journal of Production 
Economics, 118(1), 311-322. 
Wang, Y., Jiang, L., & Shen, Z. J. (2004). Channel performance under consignment contract with revenue 
sharing. Management science, 50(1), 34-47. 
 
 
  
55
Industrial and Systems Engineering Review, 6(1), 2018  ISSN (Online): 2329-0188 
Ramrakhyani et al. 
ISER © 2018  
http://iser.sisengr.org 
Appendix A 
 
Table A.1.: Payment Withdrawals for Instantaneous Payment, Infinite Cycle models at Same Order Quantity. 
 
 
 
 
Table A.2.: Payment Withdrawals for Instantaneous Payment, Infinite Cycle models at Same Order Quantity. 
 
 
 
 
Order 
Quantity 
Quantity Pulled 
by the Buyer
Replenishment 
Cycle Time for Q
Withdrawal Time 
Interval of q 
Number of 
Withdrawals in 
a Cycle
Interest 
Rate
Instantaneous 
Payment 
Withdrawal for Q
Instantaneous 
Payment 
Withdrawal for q
Q q T t n r % S1 S2
1000 1000.00 30 30.00 1 0.05 12872.16917 12872.16917
1000 500.00 30 15.00 2 0.05 12872.16917 9476.275672
1000 333.33 30 10.00 3 0.05 12872.16917 8471.646942
1000 250.00 30 7.50 4 0.05 12872.16917 7994.609172
1000 200.00 30 6.00 5 0.05 12872.16917 7716.591827
1000 166.67 30 5.00 6 0.05 12872.16917 7534.686107
1000 142.86 30 4.29 7 0.05 12872.16917 7406.443083
1000 125.00 30 3.75 8 0.05 12872.16917 7311.186482
1000 111.11 30 3.33 9 0.05 12872.16917 7237.647181
1000 100.00 30 3.00 10 0.05 12872.16917 7179.161982
1000 90.91 30 2.73 11 0.05 12872.16917 7131.5395
1000 83.33 30 2.50 12 0.05 12872.16917 7092.011629
Order 
Quantity 
Quantity Pulled 
by the Buyer
Replenishment 
Cycle Time for Q
Withdrawal Time 
Interval of q 
Number of 
Withdrawals in 
a Cycle
Interest 
Rate
Instantaneous 
Payment 
Withdrawal for Q
Instantaneous 
Payment 
Withdrawal for q
Q q T t n r % S1 S2
1000 1000.00 30 30.00 1 0.05 12872.16917 12872.16917
2000 1000.00 30 15.00 2 0.05 25744.33834 18952.55134
3000 1000.00 30 10.00 3 0.05 38616.5075 25414.94083
4000 1000.00 30 7.50 4 0.05 51488.67667 31978.43669
5000 1000.00 30 6.00 5 0.05 64360.84584 38582.95914
6000 1000.00 30 5.00 6 0.05 77233.01501 45208.11664
7000 1000.00 30 4.29 7 0.05 90105.18418 51845.10158
8000 1000.00 30 3.75 8 0.05 102977.3533 58489.49186
9000 1000.00 30 3.33 9 0.05 115849.5225 65138.82463
10000 1000.00 30 3.00 10 0.05 128721.6917 71791.61982
11000 1000.00 30 2.73 11 0.05 141593.8608 78446.93449
12000 1000.00 30 2.50 12 0.05 154466.03 85104.13955
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Table A.3.: Payment Withdrawals 𝑺𝑺𝟐𝟐 ′ 𝐚𝐚𝐚𝐚𝐚𝐚 𝐒𝐒𝟏𝟏′  with increasing n and t2 at constant Order Quantity 
 
 
 
 
Table A.4.: Payment withdrawal 𝑺𝑺𝟐𝟐 ′ 𝐚𝐚𝐚𝐚𝐚𝐚 𝐒𝐒𝟏𝟏′ with constant order quantity and t1, and at t2 increasing 
 
 
 
 
 
Order 
Quantity 
Quantity Pulled 
by the Buyer
Replenishment 
Cycle Time for Q
Withdrawal Time 
Interval of q 
Number of 
Withdrawals in 
a Cycle
Interest 
Rate
Time delay of 
Payment for 
Q
Payment 
Withdrawals for 
Q with Delay
Payment 
Withdrawals for 
q with Delay
Time delay of 
Payment for q
Q q T t n r % t1 S'1 S'2 t2
1000 1000.00 30 30.00 1 0.05 40 1742.1 12244.4 1
1000 500.00 30 15.00 2 0.05 40 1742.1 8574.5 2
1000 333.33 30 10.00 3 0.05 40 1742.1 7291.6 3
1000 250.00 30 7.50 4 0.05 40 1742.1 6545.4 4
1000 200.00 30 6.00 5 0.05 40 1742.1 6009.7 5
1000 166.67 30 5.00 6 0.05 40 1742.1 5581.8 6
1000 142.86 30 4.29 7 0.05 40 1742.1 5219.2 7
1000 125.00 30 3.75 8 0.05 40 1742.1 4900.8 8
1000 111.11 30 3.33 9 0.05 40 1742.1 4614.9 9
1000 100.00 30 3.00 10 0.05 40 1742.1 4354.4 10
1000 90.91 30 2.73 11 0.05 40 1742.1 4114.5 11
1000 83.33 30 2.50 12 0.05 40 1742.1 3892.2 12
Order 
Quantity 
Quantity Pulled 
by the Buyer
Replenishment 
Cycle Time for Q
Withdrawal Time 
Interval of q 
Number of 
Withdrawals in 
a Cycle
Interest 
Rate
Time delay of 
Payment for 
Q
Payment 
Withdrawals for 
Q with Delay
Payment 
Withdrawals for 
q with Delay
Time delay of 
Payment for q
Q q T t n r % t1 S'1 S'2 t2
1000 1000.00 30 30.00 1 0.05 40 1742.1 12244.4 1
2000 1000.00 30 15.00 2 0.05 40 3484.1 17149.0 2
3000 1000.00 30 10.00 3 0.05 40 5226.2 21874.8 3
4000 1000.00 30 7.50 4 0.05 40 6968.2 26181.7 4
5000 1000.00 30 6.00 5 0.05 40 8710.3 30048.4 5
6000 1000.00 30 5.00 6 0.05 40 10452.4 33491.0 6
7000 1000.00 30 4.29 7 0.05 40 12194.4 36534.6 7
8000 1000.00 30 3.75 8 0.05 40 13936.5 39206.7 8
9000 1000.00 30 3.33 9 0.05 40 15678.5 41534.3 9
10000 1000.00 30 3.00 10 0.05 40 17420.6 43543.8 10
11000 1000.00 30 2.73 11 0.05 40 19162.6 45259.9 11
12000 1000.00 30 2.50 12 0.05 40 20904.7 46706.1 12
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Table A.5.: Payment withdrawal 𝑺𝑺𝟐𝟐 ′ 𝐚𝐚𝐚𝐚𝐚𝐚 𝐒𝐒𝟏𝟏′  with increasing order quantity and t1=t2. 
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Appendix B 
Calculating the Point of Neutrality (PON): 
 S1  ′ = S2  ′ →  QCe−r 𝑟𝑟1(1 − e−rT) = qCe−r 𝑟𝑟2(1 − e−rt)  →  Qe−r𝑟𝑟1(1 − e−rT) = Qe−r 𝑟𝑟2n(1 − e−rt)  →  n e−r 𝑟𝑟1(1 − e−rnt) = e−r 𝑟𝑟2(1 − e−rt) 
→
ne−r 𝑟𝑟1er 𝑟𝑟2(1 − e−rnt) = 1(1 − e−rt) →  ner(𝑟𝑟2−𝑟𝑟1) = (1 − e−rnt)(1 − e−rt)  →  ln [ner(𝑟𝑟2−𝑟𝑟1)] = ln [(1 − e−rnt)(1 − e−rt) ] 
→ ln[n] + ln [er(𝑟𝑟2−𝑟𝑟1)] = ln [(1 − e−rnt)(1 − e−rt) ] → ln[n] + r(𝑡𝑡2 − 𝑡𝑡1) ] = ln [(1 − e−rnt)(1 − e−rt) ] 
→ r𝑡𝑡2−r 𝑡𝑡1 + ln[n] = ln �(1 − e−rnt)(1 − e−rt) �  𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒:  �(1 − e−rnt)(1 − e−rt) � = k  r 𝑡𝑡2 = ln �(1 − e−rnt)(1 − e−rt) � − ln[n] + r 𝑡𝑡1  → r 𝑡𝑡2 = ln[k] − ln[n] + r 𝑡𝑡1 → r𝑡𝑡2 = ln[k/n] + r 𝑡𝑡1 
→  𝑡𝑡2 = ln �kn�r + 𝑡𝑡1  →  PON     or     t∗2 = ln �kn� /r +  𝑡𝑡1  
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Appendix C 
Proof of Lemma I: 
 We Know k   = �(1 − e−rnt)(1 − e−rt) � Eq. (C.1) ln [k ]   = ln[(1 − e−rnt)] − ln[(1 − e−rt)] Eq. (C.2) ln [k ] − ln[n]   = ln[(1 − e−rnt)] − ln[(1 − e−rt)] − ln[n]] Eq. (C.3) ln �kn�   = ln[(1 − e−rnt)] − ln[(1 − e−rt)] − ln[n]   = ln[(1 − e−rnt)] − ln[(1 − e−rt)n] Eq. (C.4) ln �kn�   = ln ��1 − e−rnTn �� − ln ��1 − e−rTn �n�   = ln��1 − e−rT�� − ln ��1 − e−rTn �n� Eq. (C.5) 
�1 − e−rTn �n > 1 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜 ln ��1 − e−rTn �n� = +ve Eq. (C.6) 
 
Hence, ln �k
n
� =  −ve  or  ln �kn�
r
< 0   
𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤 , 𝑡𝑡2 = ln �kn�r + 𝑡𝑡1                         Hence , 𝑡𝑡2 < 𝑡𝑡1 Note: When n=1      ln �k
n
� = 0,   𝑡𝑡2 = 𝑡𝑡1  
 
Proof of Lemma II: 
 
Let S1   ′(τ) and S2   ′(τ) be the payment withdrawals and function of time (τ). Here τ is payment delay, t1 and t2 for S1   ′(τ) and S2   ′(τ) respectively. Let t2 be the time at which both S1   ′(τ) and S2   ′(τ) are equal for a given timet1 i.e. at PON, we 
have S1   ′(t1) =  S2   ′(t2). Now, since we have known:  S2′ (τ) = qCe−rt2 1(1−e−rt) And also we know t1  > 𝑡𝑡2  , hence  S2  ′ (t1  )  <   S2  ′ (t2  )   but S1  ′ (t1  ) =  S2  ′ (t2  ). Therefore S2  ′ (t1  ) <S1  ′ (t1 ). 
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Appendix D 
Calculating first and second order derivatives of supplier’s profit function:  
 
∂πBcs
∂y = 0 Eq. (D.1) 
∂πBc s
∂y = ∂∂y [S2′′ − c(y) − [2(SS + SM)(hS + hM)y ]1/2] = 0 Eq. (D.2) 
∂πBc s
∂y = (S2′′)′ − c′(y) − �(SS + SM)(hS + hM)2y �12 = 0 Eq. (D.3) 
(S2′′)′ − c′(y) = �(SS + SM)(hS + hM)2y �12 Eq. (D.4) 
(2y)1/2 = [(SS + SM)(hS + hM)]12[(S2′′)′ − c′(y)]  Eq. (D.5) yc = [(SS + SM)(hS + hM)] 2[(S2′′)′ − c′(y)]2  Eq. (D.6) 
 
Second order derivative: 
 
∂2πBcs
∂y2 = ∂2∂y2 (S2′′)′ − c′(y) − �(SS + SM)(hS + hM)2y  �
1
2 Eq. (D.7) 
∂2πBcs
∂y2 = 0 − c′′(y) − �(SS + SM)(hS + hM)8y3 �12 Eq. (D.8) 
∂2πBcs
∂y2 < 0 Eq. (D.9) 
 
 
61
